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In
attempting to spotlight the reasons behind police inefficiency which is not
particular to Nigeria alone, but many third world countries and African
nations in general, we will examine the causes as described by empirical
studies. One very useful study was conducted by Alice Hills and published
by The Journal of Modern African Studies in its September, 2007
issue. The study is titled “Police commissioners, presidents and the
governance of security.”
The study, informed by earlier studies that pinned the major problem to governance of the force, observed and recorded situations from four different countries of Africa, namely Ghana, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Uganda. The findings were similar across the board, with the difference primarily being the extent or intensity of the problem being more pronounced in one country than another.
The police it was discovered, faced three conflicting roles. (1) There are the donors from abroad (external) who make funds available for improving police work such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) and the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) who promote certain norms and processes on one hand (2) Internally, there are the civilian authorities, their institutions and their operating practices; the processes they advocate having been developed between governmental departments and civil society; (3) And finally there is the presidency (executive) who usually control the hiring and firing of the highest officer be he Commissioner of Police or Inspector General of Police, depending on country specific title.
Various researches, not just Hill’s came to the conclusion that African Police are accountable to just one master, their Presidents. Police in practice enforce political decisions of their political authorities “and references to democratic forms of accountability are rarely more than tactical consensus or gestures to donors.” Hills added that more often than not, police actions in such countries are at variance with the democratic requirements of accountability for their actions.
Hills studies in fact points out that it is wrong to assess the effectiveness of the police through the mirrors of democratic ideals. Studies that did that, she claims result in inaccurate analysis because the police are in actuality governed by presidential preference. That was why her study tries to figure out the locus of influence within the police by exploring the influence between the police chief and the President. The direct influence observed is remarkable. In Zambia for example, President Mwanawasa was quoted dismissing his Police Chief for doing two things which appear in line with his work, i.e. delaying the arrest of an opposition leader while questioning the legitimacy in legal terms of the President’s verbal orders for the arrest.
Hills, and Klantschnig (2009) who specifically studied Nigerian law enforcement in his work titled “The politics of law enforcement in Nigeria” both agree that the governing process is the area that needs to be studied more intensely, with the intention of strengthening and empowering the law enforcement institution, making it more independent of political influence. Klantschnig concludes that his study of Nigeria “confirms views of politicized nature of law enforcement.”
The irony of all this is that; while the presidency always target the police for exerting control and using them politically, they know the police are generally powerless, and therefore do not entrust their personal security to them. They usually form a special security unit from intelligence sources, and fill such positions with relatives and close associates they personally trust. Likewise Presidents use special units to deal with special matters, such as the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency NDLEA formed to deal with the menace of drug use, trafficking and sale. They do not leave such political pet projects to the inefficient police. In actual fact Hill’s study goes on to say “Presidents do not want an effective or efficient police answerable to parliamentary committees or judicial enquiries (some have committed so many crimes that they cannot afford to), but they value the police as a tool for enforcing political decisions, maintaining order, regulating activities and regime representation.”
While other security establishments such as the military are empowered, and can generally stand on its own, the police are left to find institutions or organizations to lurch on for resources. For example, in 2005, the Inspector General of Police for Nigeria Mr. Sunday Ehindero was quoted saying “It is disheartening to see policemen live in a kennel...The conditions in some barracks are, to say the least, nauseating.” The embarrassing way in which the public help support the police at check points by throwing stipends at them was cited as a means of complementing their meager salaries.
One would think that with such accounts only uneducated recruits with no options left will aspire to join the police force. But accounts from some educated and seasoned police members will suggest differently. For example, Nuhu Ribadu, the son of the famous Ribadun Yola of cherished memory was a guest of our online publication The Optimist Voice last year. He holds both bachelor’s and graduate degrees in law, and had worked for the Nigerian Police for about twenty years. He rose through the ranks, and was personally plucked and assigned a new pet project by the former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003. Whether the intension was genuine or not, Mr. Ribadu was highly acclaimed as bringing back, even if briefly, the integrity of a police force unit quite rare in African setting.
Hills however, sees the use and manipulations of the police force by Presidents as a tool the former Nigerian President also used. Generally her study described how “Presidents intimidate, constrain and use the police for purposes for which public accountability plays no part.” She cited President Obasanjo’s frequent hiring and firing of Police chiefs as one such ways. Musliu Smith, the first IG was fired because he displeased the President, while his successor whom to the public was fired because of the scandal of misappropriation of funds after investigations by the EFCC, was actually according to the study probably “sacrificed” to appease donors. Sunday Ehandero however, despite reaching retirement age after coming on board had his tenure extended twice because he was found to be useful in carrying out Obasanjo’s interests.
Klantschnig also appears to back Hills' premise that most donor and UN related studies do not place any emphasis on the role played by the governance of the police force. He calls such studies superficial using media reports as sources, while the media themselves do not dwell on deeper issues, but street events. For example he says such earlier studies funded externally - though they dwelt much on issue of trafficking and laws in place - did not highlight that heroin and cocaine seizures in Africa account for less than one percent (1%) of global statistics (citing UNDCP 1998: 17-18).
Klantschnig however claims that the pattern of control structure where the head of such projects as NDLEA answers directly to the President helped the project in funding and influence. It set a precedent used later by Presidents for control pattern towards their pet projects. But it is worthwhile to note that the externally funded police force support tend to work for their funding agencies and usually pitching the President’s political and personal interest against those of its external sources. And that the experience garnered by presidents, though the hard way, seem to form the basis upon which such presidents form their own pet agencies that came later such as the Economic and Financial Crime Commission EFCC.
Finally in the question and answer section of the conference on good governance organized under the auspices of The Optimist Voice last year, Mr. Ribadu, the first police officer to become Chairman for EFCC also pointed out one very critical issue highlighted by Hills studies; i.e. finding ways to strengthen various institutions so they can stand on their own, regardless of who is in political control.
In answering a question on whether there was any need to review and amend the constitution, Ribadu answered that in his opinion (as a legal professional) the Nigerian Constitution is fine. It is adequate as it is to address issues. It is the people (especially the executive) who are not willing to work with it, bending the rules the way they like. Politicians and leaders are not willing to act within the bounds of the nation’s laws. They act above the law most of the time and that is the problem. It appears to be an African problem, he concluded, where he cited a recent event in Niger Republic, where the President Tandja Mammadou, just one individual, forced the amendment of the constitution after his second tenure was about to expire so he could run for the third time, just as his former Nigerian counterpart Olusegun Obasanjo attempted in 2006, but failed.
The structures that ensure effective governance such as lawmaking, the courts, the police as institutions, and all other important counterbalancing structures have to be strengthened beyond individual influence of the executive so they could earn the respect and efficiency they deserve for effective service. Most African nations are yet to achieve that standard. In Nigeria since the return of democratic form of government in 1999, any credible effort such as those by House Speaker Ghali Na’abba and some of his counterpart to build the credibility of NASS and its structures in counterbalancing power and checking excesses by the executive was sabotaged by its immediate President at that time, Mr. Obasanjo at the Presidency.
Likewise people such as Ribadu at law enforcement who were effective by far compared to their predecessors, who enjoyed the support of the same Obasanjo for reasons best known to the former President, was kicked out as soon as his employer left office through the influence of those he had made accountable in the past. Mr. Na’abba and Mr. Ribadu along with many others effective at their posts are now out of the loop and forced into exile literally. Even one of the most effective and performing executive, who in spite of the reigning unchecked executive power popular at his time 1999-2007 managed to develop his state, the Bauchi State Governor Ahmed Mu’azu is among the refugees of hard work. A very discouraging situation.
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